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Elder: Bankruptcy Law

BANKRUPTCY LAW

IN RE CHG INTERNATIONAL,
INCORPORATED: THE ORDINARY
COURSE OF BUSINESS EXCEPTION;
WHAT YOU SEE IS WHAT YOU GET
I.

INTRODUCTION:

In re CHG International, Inc., 1 announced the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2), the "Ordinary
Course of Business" exception to a preferential transfer. 2 The
CHG court examined the legislative history and the underlying policies behind section 547, and determined that the 1984
amendment was intended to exclude long-term debt from the
exception, even though the amendment deleted the forty five
day time limitation. s Subsequently, relying on the CHG ruling,
the Ninth Circuit decided In re ZZZZ Best Co., Inc.,4 again holding that long-term debts did not fall within the Ordinary
Course of Business exception. 5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to ZZZZ Best, and reversed the Ninth Circuit
interpretation of section 54 7(c)(2). 6 This article will examine the
1. In re CHG Int.'l, Inc., 897 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1989) (per Browning, J.; the other
panel members were Alcaron, J., and Hall, J.).
2. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1487. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). A preference is a payment to a unsecured or undersecured creditor within ninety days prior
to filing for bankruptcy, on an antecedent debt, which places the creditor in a better financial position than the debtor's other creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
3. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1487.
4. 921 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Union Bank v. Wolas, Chapter 7
Trustee for the Estate ofZZZZ Best Co. Inc., 50 U.S. _,112 S. Ct. 527 (1991).
5. ZZZZ Best, 921 F.2d at 969. The ZZZZ Best case involved a preferential transfer made to a creditor on an eight month line of credit. ZZZZ Best, 921 F.2d at 968. The
Ninth Circuit determined that the eight month line of credit constituted long term
debt. lei. at 969. In comparison, the CHG court, while not ruling specifically on what time
period constitutes long term debt, found that the one year and seven month notes were
long term debts. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1484. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
6. In re Z'CZZ Best Co., Inc., 921 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Union Bank
v. Wolas, Chapter 7 Trustee for the Estate ofZZZZ Best Co., Inc., 50 U.S. _,112 S.
Ct. 527 (1991). "In sum, we hold that payments on long-term debts, as well as payments
on short-term debt, may qualify for the ordinary course of business exception to the
trustee's power to avoid preferential transfers." Union Bank, 112 S. Ct. 533.
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Ninth Circuit opinion of In re CHG,7 and discuss the Supreme
Court ruling and its implications.
II.

FACTUAL STATEMENT

In re eRG, involved several banking transactions between
the debtor, CHG International ("CHG") and Barclays Bank PLC
("Barclays").8 Barclays made two loans to CHG, which were the
subject of the preference action. 9 Initially, Barclays advanced
a one-year line of credit to CHG up to $1,200,000, secured by
a pledged certificate of deposit in the amount of $1,200,000. 10
This "CD" loan was renewed several times. 11

Barclays made a formal demand for payment the day before
the promissory note became due. 12 Barclays advised CHG of its
intention to foreclose on its security if the note were not paid. 13
CHG made a $14,224.99 interest payment on the CD loan,
within ninety days of the filing ofCHG's Chapter 11 petition. 14
Barclays made a second loan of$1,000,000 to CHG.16 This
"real estate" loan was also evidenced by a promissory note
requiring CHG to make monthly interest payments, with the
principal coming due in seven months. 16 CHG granted Barclays
a deed of trust on eighty five acres of undeveloped waterfront
7. 897 F.2d 1479 (1990).
8. CHG, 897 F.2d 1479 (9th Cir. 1990). CHG is a Washington Corporation
involved in real estate development. [d. Barclays is a British bank doing business in
Seattle, Washington. [d.
9. [d. at 1480. At the time ofCHG's bankruptcy filing both loans were undersecured. [d.
10. [d. CHG executed a promissory note, which required CHG to make monthly interest payments on the unpaid principal balance. [d. Westside Federal Savings
and Loan held the Certificate of Deposit. [d.
11. [d. CHG continued to make its monthly interest payments under the first note
during the renewal periods. [d. CHG only missed one monthly interest payment on the
CD loan. [d.
12. [d.
13. [d. CHG contacted Westside, who held the CD and requested Westside to cash
the CD and transfer the proceeds to Barelays. [d. Due to a penalty for early withdrawal,
the value ofthe CD was reduced to $1,164,126.32. [d.
14. [d. This was the first so-called preferential transfer. [d. CHG filed for
bankruptcy protection on December 6, 1986, therefore any transfer to a creditor
after September 6, fell within the ninety day preference period. [d.
16. [d. This was a seven month term loan, secured by a deed of trust on real property. [d. CHG held an executory real estate contract on the Vashon Property. [d. at
1480·81.
16. [d. Barclays held a deed of trust that was junior to a deed of trust granted
to Westside, securing a loan in the approximate amount of $2,000,000. [d. Barclays
was also junior to the interest of several contract vendors. [d. at 1481.
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property, known as the Vashon property, valued at $500,000. 17
At the time ofCRG's bankruptcy filing, the principal of the second loan had not been reduced. 1S
The eighty five acres of undeveloped land was appraised as
part of a larger parcel containing 127 acres. 19 CRG defaulted
on the underlying real estate contract subsequently forfeiting
its interest in the Vashon property to the numerous contract
vendors who were owed $350,000. 20
As additional security for the second loan, CRG executed
an additional note for $500,000, secured by a deed of trust on
a second parcel of real estate, known as the Richland property.21 This deed of trust was subordinate to a deed of trust
granted to Washington Mutual Savings and Loan, securing a
loan in the principal amount of $2,122,500. 22 The Richland
property was sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale under the
Washington Mutual deed of trust and purchased by Washington
for $2,351,041.97. 23
In the course of the loan interest payments, CRG misses
only one payment under the first and the second loan. 24 CRG
made an interest payment to Barclays on the second real
estate loan which was within the ninety day preference
period. 26
17. [d. at 1480-81. This property was located on Vashon Island and was purchased
by CHG under a separate, executory real estate contract. [d. Barclays held a deed of
trust that was junior to a deed of trust granted to Westside, securing a loan in the
approximate amount of $2,000,000. [d. Barclays was also junior to the interest of several contract vendors. [d. at 1481.
18. [d. CHG filed its voluntary petition on December 5, 1985, and the second note
was due on December 28, 1984. [d.
19. [d. The market value for the entire 127 acres was no more than $510,000. [d.
CHG only held title to 85 acres out of the 127. [d.
20. [d. This wiped out Barclays' security interest in the property, rendering
Barclays undersecured. [d.
21. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1481. The second parcel of real estate was located in
Richland, Washington. [d.
22. [d. Washington Mutual held the first deed of trust on the Richland property securing a loan to CHG. [d.
23. [d. The noI\iudicial foreclosure wiped out Barclays' junior interest in this property leaving Barclays unsecured on its second loan to CHG. [d.
24. [d.
25. [d. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The date ofCHG's
voluntary filing was December 5, 1984, therefore, the preference period extended back
to include any payments made after September 6, 1984. See supra note 14. See also
note 2, for a definition of a preference.
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CHG filed its petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code on December 5, 1984. 26 Two
years later, CHG filed an adversary complaint in the bankruptcy court alleging that it was entitled to recover the two interest payments made to Barclays within the ninety day preference
period pursuant to section 547(b).27 Barclays brought a motion
for summary judgment based on its affirmative defense, the
ordinary course of business exception. 28 The bankruptcy court
denied the motion, finding as a matter of law that section
547(c)(2), the ordinary course of business exception to preferences, was not available to Barclays because the subject debts
were long-term loans not ordinary trade credits. 29 The bankruptcy court granted CHG's counter motion for summary judgment, characterizing the two interest payments as preferences,
and awarding judgment against Barclays in the total amount
of $30,007.55, including prejudgment interest and costs. 30
Barclays appealed to the district court, this time conceding
that the interest payments were preferential transfers, but contesting the finding that the payments did not fall into the
ordinary course of business exception. 31 Agreeing with Barclays'
position, the district court held that section 547(c)(2) did
include long-term debt. 32 CHG then appealed the District
court's findings to the Ninth Circuit. 33
,.

26. eHG, 897 F.2d at 1481. CHG filed its voluntary petition pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 301, which provides:
A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced
by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under
such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor under such
chapter. The commencement of a voluntary case under a
chapter of this title constitutes an order for relief under
such chapter. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
27. eHG, 897 F.2d at 1481. Barclays argued that the payments were not preferential and asserted an affirmative defense maintaining that the payments fell
within the ordinary course of business exception to the avoidance of preferential
transfers.ld. Section 547(b) grants the authority to recover property for the benefit
of the bankruptcy estate as part of the debtor's general powers of avoidance. 11
U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982).
28. eHG, 897 F.2d at 1481.
29. Id. The court relied on the pre-1984 language of §547(c) which required
forty-five days in accordance with trade billing cycles.ld. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B)
(1982), which provided: "made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred."
Id.
30. eHG, 897 F.2d at 1481 n.l.
31. Id. at 1481.
32. In re CHG Int'l., Inc., 87 B.R. 647 (W.D. Wash. 1988) relJ'd 897 F.2d 1479 (9th
Cir. 1990) (relying on In re Iowa Premium Service Co. Fuel and Oil Supply, 695 F.2d
1109, 1111 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Terminaling, Inc., 72 B.R. 752, 762 (S.D. Tex. 1987».
33. eHG, 897 F.2d at 1481.
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III.

BACKGROUND

A.

11 U.S.C. § 547(B);

35

PREFERENCE

Section 547(b) gives a trustee or debtor in possession the
power to avoid certain transfers of the debtor's property made
within ninety days prior to filing bankruptcy, which results in a
benefit to one creditor, to the detriment of other creditors.34 The
preference rules were designed to ensure an orderly and equitable
distribution of payments to the debtor's creditors within the
months immediately preceding the filing of a bankruptcy petition. 35 Without this protection there is the risk that the debtor's
bankruptcy estate or property might be depleted by major creditors or that creditors would "race to the courthouse" to dismember the debtor during its decline into bankruptcy.36
However, the bankruptcy code contains seven exceptions to
the preference rule which allow the debtor to obtain some
credit prior to bankruptcy and allow creditors to retain payments for certain types of transactions immediately prior to
bankruptcy.37 If the seven exceptions of section 547(c) were not
available, the debtor's probability of sliding into bankruptcy,
during severe financial troubles, would greatly increase. 38
34. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), provides:
"The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the
debtor before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of
the petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date
of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the
time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) That enables such creditor to receive more than such
creditor would receive if(A) the case were a case under Chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the
extent provided by the provisions of this title." Id.
35. In the Matter ofXonics Imaging, Inc., 837 F.2d 763,765 (7th Cir. 1988). See
generally McCoid, Bankruptcy Preferences and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67
VA. L. REV. 249 (1981).
36. In re Hancock Nelson Mercantile Co., Inc., 122 B.R. 1006, 1010 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1991). See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Congo 1st Sess. 373, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5874, 6329.
37. Xonics, 837 F.2d at 765-66. See generally 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(1)-(7) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
38. Xonics, 837 F.2d at 765; Hancock, 122 B.R. at 1010.
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In re CHG, discussed section 547(c)(2) which is commonly
referred to as the ordinary course of business exception to a
preferential transfer. 39 Section 547(c)(2) allows a creditor to
except a preferential transfer if the transfer was in payment
of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of business of the
debtor and the transferee and the transfer was made according to ordinary business terms. 40
Prior to the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the
Bankruptcy Act did not contain a comparable provision to section
547(c)(2).41 Instead, the courts created the "Current Expense"
rule. 42 The current expense rule covered situations in which the
debtor's payments to a creditor, immediately preceding bankruptcy, did not diminish the estate, because the debtor received
tangible goods in the exchange. 43 The overhaul of the bankruptcy
system in 1978 created three comparable subsections."
39. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1482-84. See supra note 2 for an explanation of a preference.
40. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2), which provides:
(2) to the extent that such transfer was:
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial
affairs of the debtor and the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms.ld.
See H.R. REP. No. 5174, 98th Cong., Pub. L. 98-353. See also CHG at 1483 n.3, for a
brief discussion of the section 547(c)(2) legislative evolution.
41. See § 60 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, as amended and codified in 11 U.S.C.
§ 96 (1976). This section provides in relevant part:
"(a)(l) A preference is a transfer, as defined in this title, of
any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered
by such debtor while insolvent and within four months
before the filing by or against him the petition initiating a
proceeding under this title, the effect of which transfer will
be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of
his debt than some other creditor of the same class.
(b) Any such preference may be avoided by the trustee if the
creditor receiving it or to be benefitted thereby or his agent
acting with reference thereto has, at the time when the
transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor
is insolvent. Where the preference is voidable, the trustee
may recover the property .... " Id.
42. National Bank of Jacksonville, 112 F.2d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1940); 3 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY 'i 60.23 (14th ed. 1977).
43. Jacksonville, 112 F.2d at 382.
44. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(4) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See infra
note 60 for a definition of the contemporaneous exchange rule.
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As originally enacted in 1978, section 547(c)(2) contained
an additional element requiring that the payment, to the creditor, occurred within forty-five days after the debt was
incurred. 40 The forty-five day rule was designed to allow payments of essentially short-term trade credit.'6 The rule was
designed to leave undisturbed normal financial relationships,
and resulted from the House Judiciary Committee's judgment
that thirty days represented the normal credit term, with an
additional fifteen day period for preparation of a bill and payment by the debtor.47
In 1984, pursuant to the Bankruptcy Amendment and
Federal Judgeship Act ("BAFJA"), Congress amended the code
to eliminate the forty-five day limitation." The BAFJA was
necessitated by the Supreme Court ruling in Northern Pipeline
Construction Company v. Marathon Pipeline CO.,'9 holding the
bankruptcy jurisdictional system unconstitutiona1. 60 By removing the forty-five day limitation, and not imposing a new or
different time requirement, Congress appeared to have expanded the protection of section 547(c)(2) to a potentially wide variety of transactions which it previously deemed unworthy of
protection. 61 Because the section did not contain a time constraint, arguably all debts, both long-term and short-term,
could fall into the section, as long as the debts could meet the
other remaining requirements of the section. 62
45. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) (1982). See supra note 29. See also Fidelity Savings
and Investment Co. v. New Hope Baptist, 880 F.2d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir. 1989).
46. In re Finn, 909 F.2d 903, 907 (6th Cir. 1990).
47. Broome, Payment on Long-Term Debt as Voidable Preferences: The Impact of
the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendment, 1987 DUKE L. J. 78, 97 (1987) [hereinafter Broome].
See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Congo 1st Sess. 373, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6329; SEN R. No. 989, 95th Congo 2d Sess. 88, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CONGo CODE & ADMIN. NEWS 5787,5874.
48. H.R. REP. No. 5174, 98th Cong., Pub. L. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). See CHG
897 F.2d at 1483.
49. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
50. Marathon, 458 U.S. 50,87 (1982);" We conclude that 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976
ed. & Supp. IV), as added by § 241(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, has impermissible removed most, if not all, of the "essential attributes of the judicial power" from the
Art. III district court, and has vested those attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct. Such a
grant of jurisdiction cannot be sustained as an exercise of Congress' power to create
adjuncts to Art. III courts.- Id. See App. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPI'CY, 'i XX-I (15th ed. 1988).
51. Morris, Substantive Consumer Bankruptcy Reform in the Bankruptcy
Amendments Act of 1984,27 WM & MARy L. REV. 91, 122- 123 (1985). (arguing that the
1984 amendment expands protection of Section 547(c)(2) to "virtually all timely payments of installment obligations-). The leading bankruptcy treatise states that it is
arguable that the elimination of the forty-five day limit allows long-term debt to be
excepted. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, '1547.10 (15th ed. 1988).
52. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1483 n.5.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 7

38

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:31

The forty-five day rule was criticized as overbroad and
underbroad, both too vague and too precise. 63 The argument was
that the rule was vague because it was too difficult to tell
when a debt was incurred; it was too precise because it was
designed to reflect the thirty day billing cycle plus the fifteen
day invoicing cycle, and it was rigidly insensitive to variations
in business practices. 64
Congress hastily eliminated the forty-five day requirement
from the ordinary course of business exception, due in part, to
Congress' preoccupation with the jurisdictional crisis facing the
bankruptcy court system resulting from the Supreme Court ruling in Marathon, that the bankruptcy jurisdictional system
was unconstitutional. 66 The legislative history accompanying the
1984 amendment to section 547(c) is scant and it is unclear how
Congress intended the deletion to affect the application of the
section. 56 Neither the House nor the Senate held hearings on the
bill. 67 However, the Congressional record contains statements
from senators Dole and DeConcini, pertaining to the elimination of the forty-five day requirement, stating that the amendment to section 547 will relieve buyers of commercial paper with
maturities in excess of forty-five days from the charges ofpreferential transfers. 68
53. In re Control Electric, 91 B.R. 1010, 1013 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988). See
Broome, supra note 47 at 100; Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character,
and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3,129-130 (1987) [hereinafter Weisberg]. See also Fortgang & King, The 1978 Bankruptcy Code: Some
Wrong Decisions, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1148, 1167-70 (1981).
54. Weisberg, supra note 53 at 130 n.529.
55. H.R. REP. No. 5174, 98th Congo 1st Sess. Pub. L. 98-353. See supra notes 4850 and accompanying text; Marathon, 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
56. In re Control Electric, 91 B.R. 1010, 1013 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988); In re
Finn, 909 F.2d 903, 906 (6th Cir.1990); CHG, 897 F.2d at 1484.
57. Broome, supra note 47 at 88.
58. 130 CONGo REC. S. 8887, 8897 (1987); Fidelity Savings and Investment Co.v.
New Hope Baptist, 880 F.2d 1172, 1180 (10th Cir. 1989). See App 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY' XX-80 (15th ed. 1988);
DeConcini: "I know that the Senator from Kansas, along
with the Senator from South Carolina, was the principal
sponsor of this provision deleting subsection (c)(2) of section
547 of the Code, and I would like to clarify two points regarding the effect of this change.
Am I correct that the elimination of the 45-day restriction in
subsection (c)(2) of section 547 will relieve buyers of commercial paper with maturities in excess of 45 days of the concern that repayments of such paper at maturity might be
considered as preferential transfers?
Dole: That is correct, assuming that the ordinary course of
business or financial affairs and ordinary business terms
requirements are met." Id.
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COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit relied upon the 1978 and 1984 legislative
history of section 547(c)(2).69 First, the court examined whether
Congress in 1984, by eliminating the forty-five day requirement, intended to fundamentally change the scope of the ordinary course exception to include more than transactions which
were substantially contemporaneous exchanges. 6o The court
examined the legislative history, the commentators and cases,
and concluded that the correct view was that section 547(c)(2)
did not apply to long-term loans. 61
Analyzing the 1984 amendment to section 547(c)(2), the
court found that Congress initially used the forty-five day
period because it believed the forty-five days reflected the
typical billing cycle of transactions intended to qualify within the exception. 62 The forty-five day limit was widely criticized
by consumer lenders, trade creditors and paper issuers, as
not accurately reflecting their billing cycles, therefore, Congress
eliminated the requirement. 63 The court points out that a
literal and superficial reading of the rule allows long-term
debt to fall within the exception."
However, the court observed that the majority of cases
hold that section 547(c)(2) does not apply to long-term loans. 66
These cases found that either Congress did not intend section
547(c)(2) to except long-term debt from avoidance, long-term
debt is not incurred in a debtor's ordinary course of business,
or both. 66 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Bourgeois court
reasoning, that Congress did not intend to change the spirit of
59. eHG, 897 F.2d at 1482-84.
60. Id. at 1483. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (the contemporaneous exchange rule). A contemporaneous exchange occurs when the debtor
pays the creditor almost simultaneously within receipt of the goods. Id.
61. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1482. "[We] conclude that interest payments on long-

term debt were not intended to be covered under the ordinary course of business exception .... " Id.
62. Id. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
63. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1482.
64. Id. at 1484. However, the court opposed a literal reading based on its interpretation of Congress's intent in eliminating the forty-five day requirement in 1984.
Id. at 1483- 84.
65. Id. (relying on In re Bourgeois, 58 B.R. 657 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986); In re RDC
Corp., 88 B.R. 97 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1988); In re Jackson, 90 B.R. 793 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1988); In re Control Electric, 91 B.R. 1010,1017 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988».
66. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1484.
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the section from dealing mainly with trade credit transactions which are substantially contemporaneous exchanges. 67
The Bourgeois court found that to hold such payments on
long-term loans as within the ordinary course of business within the meaning of section 547(c)(2) "would be to flout the clear
intent of that subsection, and the entire policy of the preference
provisions as a whole. "68 Such a holding would virtually strip the
preference provisions of the Code of all meaning. 69 To further
explain its holding, the Ninth Circuit argued that if the exception were to include long-term debt, the effect of the preference
provision would be neutralized by allowing almost every kind
of payment a debtor makes during the ninety day period. 70
The court found that the majority of courts that considered
whether long-term debt fell within the exception after the
1984 amendment, followed Bourgeois. 71 In re RDC Corp.,72
maintained that long-term loans were antecedent debts in the
traditional sense because the monthly payments of interest
did not represent ongoing trade transactions. 73 The decision
67. Id. Bourgeois, 58 B.R. at 657. The Bourgeois court held that principal and
interest payments by the debtor to a bank on long-term loans were not intended by
the 1984 Amendment to fall within section 547(c)(2). Id. at 660. In Bourgeois, the
trustee brought a preference action against Bank of Lafayette and Guaranty Bank &
Trust.Id. Similar to Barc1ays in CHG, the bank did not dispute that the elements of
section 547(b) were met. Id. Instead, their argument maintained that the payments
fell within section 547(c)(2), the ordinary course of business exception. Id. See supra
note 60 for definition of contemporaneous exchange.
68. Bourgeois, 58 B.R. at 660. The court felt that due to the lack oflegislative history surrounding the deletion of the forty five day rule, it had the authority to define
the meaning and scope of the ordinary course of business exception in light of the
amendment.Id. The court examined the goals and purposes behind section 547(b) and
section 547(c)(2) and determined that Congress did not intend to fundamentally
change the scope of the exception. Id. "The forty five day limit was eliminated so that
the provisions of the Code would comport with normal business policies." Id. The court
was of the opinion that the 1984 amendment removed only an arbitrary time limit, and
that the spirit and intent of section 547(c)(2), i.e. the exemption from avoidance of trade
credit transactions which are substantially contemporaneous exchanges, remained the
same.Id. at 660-661.
69. Id. at 662.
70. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1484. In effect, the court was arguing that by including longterm debt into the exception, the exception would swallow the rule. Id.
71. Id. at 1485. (citing In re ROC Corp., 88 B.R. 97 (Bankr. W.O. La. 1988); In
re Jackson, 90 B.R. 793, (Bankr. D.S.C. 1988); In re Control Electric, Inc., 91 B.R. 1010
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988».
72. 88 B.R. 97 (Bankr. W.O. La. 1988).
73. RDC Corp., 88 B.R. at 97 (citing Lingley v. Stuart Shaines, Inc. (In re AcmeDunham Inc.), 50 B.R. 734, 741-42 (D.C. Me. 1985). An antecedent debt is a debt, owed
by the debtor to the creditor, prior to the transfer to the creditor. See In re Comark,
124 B.R. 806, 811 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991).
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to pay them was made far in advance of the payment, at the
time the loan was negotiated, and nothing is exchanged at the
time of payment which helps the debtor to continue In
business. 74
The court also addressed the issue of when the obligation
to pa'y interest arose. 76 The court noted that under
Washington law the obligation to pay interest arose when the
promissory notes were signed, not when the interest payments were made. 76 In the district court, Barclays advanced
the argument that the payment of interest was essentially a
contemporaneous exchange, because the interest payments
were incurred monthly when they became due. 77 In re Western
World Funding 78 had previously rejected this argument,
holding that a debt for principal and interest is incurred at
the signing of the promissory note and the completion of
the transfer of funds to the debtor. 79
The court reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment for Barclays and remanded to the district court with
orders to reinstate the bankruptcy court's judgment in favor of
CRG.80 The court found specifically that Congress did not
intend section 547(c)(2) to include payment on long-term debt.81
V.

SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS

On December 11, 1991, the United States Supreme Court
handed down a unanimous ruling on Union Bank V. Wolas,82
announcing the correct interpretation of section 547(c)(2).83
74. Acme-Dunham, 50 B.R. at 741-42.
75. CHG, 897 F.2d at 1486.
76. Id. See Pedersen v. Fisher, 139 Wash. 28, 32, 245 P. 30, 32 (1926).
77. In re CHG Int.l, Inc., 87 B.R. 647, 653 (W.D. Wash 1988).
78. 54 B.R. 470 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985).
79. Western World, 54 B.R. at 477. The court in Western World, applied pre-1984
BAFJA law to the case, because the case was filed in 1982. [d. at 470. The debtor made
substantial interest and principal payments to several creditors within the ninety day
preference period prior to filing bankruptcy. Id. at 473. The creditors advanced the
argument that the receipt of principal and interest was not on account of an antecedent
debt [547(b)(2)] because the debt was incurred when it is due, not at time of the signing of the loan. Id. at 477. However, the court held that as soon as the promissory notes
were signed, and the funds were transferred to the debtor, the creditor had a claim
against the debtor. Id.
80. CHG 897 F.2d at 1487.
81. Id.
82. 50 U.S. _ , 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991).
83. Union Bank, 112 S. Ct. 527.
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Certiori was granted because of a conflict, between the Ninth
and Sixth Circuits, in interpretating the section.1U The Court
held that section 547(c)(2) applied to long-term as well as
short-term debts, overruling the Ninth Circuit approach and
ZZZZ Best. 86
A.

MAJORITY OPINION

1.

Textual Analysis

First, the Court examined the text of the section, and
determined that the most telling feature of section 54 7( c)(2)
was the absence of any language distinguishing between longterm debt and short-term debt. 86 The Court noted that the section focused on whether the debt was incurred, and payment
made, in the ordinary course of business, rather than focusing on a time limitation. 87 The clarity of the text imposed a
heavy burden of persuading the Court that Congress intended to create or preserve a special rule for long-term debt. 88
Therefore, the Court concluded that the text provided no support for interpreting a distinction between long-term and
short-term debt. 89

2.

Legislative History

The Court went on to examine the legislative history surrounding the 1978 enactment of section 547(c)(2),90 and the 1984
BAFJA amendments. 9 ! First, the Court analyzed the 1984
amendment. 92 The Court did not dispute the accuracy of the
intent of the legislators in deleting the time limitation. 93
Instead, the Court reasoned that even though Congress may not
have foreseen all of the consequences of the amendment, that
84. Id. at 529. See In re Finn, 909 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1990) (interpreting section
547(c)(2) to include long.term debt).
85. Union Bank, 112 S. Ct. at 533.
86. Id. at 530.
87.Id.
88. Id. (citing U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989».
89. Id. at 530.
90. Id. at 530-31. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
91. Union Bank, 112 S. Ct. at 531. Bankruptcy Amendment and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 95-353, 98 Stat. 333.
.
92. Union Bank, at 531.
93. [d.
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alone was not enough to refuse to give effect to the plain
meaning of the section. 94
N ext, the Court addressed the history of the voidable preference prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in
1978. 96 The Court discredited the argument that section
547(c)(2) was created as the statutory equivalent of the "current expense" rule. 96 Notably, the Court examined the other
exceptions of section 547(c) which resolved a majority of the situations covered by the current expense rule. 97 The Court stated that additionally, Congress carefully examined the entire
area of preferences and the exceptions when it completely
rewrote the provisions in 1978. 98 Therefore, the text of section
547(c)(2) was a deliberate choice. 99

3.

Policy Argument

Lastly, the Court examined the policy implications associated with section 547(c)(2), holding that the two basic intertwined polices, detering a race to the courthouse, and equality
of distribution, did not warrant a distinction between long
and short-term debt. loo The Court noted the equal distribution
policy arguably supported the distinction. lol However, because
the statutory text made no distinction, it precluded an analysis that separated the two policies. lo2
The Court determined that the second policy applied
equally to long and short-term creditors and indirectly furthers the goal of equal distribution. lo3 Therefore, the Court
was unwilling to follow the district court and the court of
appeals conclusion that the policies behind section 547(c)(2)
supported the distinction between long and short-term
debt. lo4
94. [d.
95. [d.

96. [d. at 532. See supra notes 42·44 and accompanying text.
97. Union Bank, 112 S. Ct. at 532. See 11 U.S.C. §547(c)(1)·(c)(7) (1982 & Supp.
III 1985). See supra note 60 for an explanation of section 547(c)(1).
98. Union Bank, 112 S. Ct. at 532. See supra notes 45·47 and accompanying text.
99. Union Bank, 112 S. Ct. at 532·33.
100. [d. at 533.
101. [d.
102. [d.
103. [d.
104. [d.
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CONCURRING OPINION

[Vol. 22:31

Justice Scalia concurred with the result reached by the
majority.lo6 However, Justice Scalia noted that it was regrettable that our legal culture credited and allowed such arguments to be addressed, when the statute was so "utterly devoid"
of language that could remotely distinguish between longterm and short-term debt. lOS
VI.

CONCLUSION

By overruling the Ninth Circuit interpretation of section
547, the Supreme Court demonstrated its propensity to support
the plain meaning doctrine. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion chided the legal system for supporting an argument based
on sketchy legislative interpretation and policy. The Supreme
Court decision, signals that the 1978 Bankruptcy Code and the
subsequent amendments should be construed literally.

Janina M. Elder*

105. Id. at 534 (joining the majority in Parts II and III, responding to the leg·
islative history).
106. Id. "Since there was no contention of a "scrivener's error" producing an
absurd result, the plain text of the statute should have made this litigation unnecessary
and unmaintainable." Id.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992.
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